


**Philosophy 203**  
***History of Modern Western Philosophy***

**Russell Marcus**  
**Hamilton College**  
**Spring 2016**



**Class #27**  
**The Analytic**  
**The First Antinomy**

# Business

- Final Exam
  - For those who did the End-of-Unit-4 Writing Assignment
  - Friday, May 13, 2pm
  - Preparatory Questions are on the website.
- End of Unit 5 Writing Assignment
  - For those who wrote the paper and are not taking the final
  - Take questions at end of class.
  - We'll pick numbers at the end of Thursday's class.
- Three other things
  - Course Evaluations (Hamilton)
  - Peer Evaluations: required assignment for this course
  - Also, a very short survey (for posterity) from me

# The Aesthetic and the Analytic

## Review

- Introduction to the *Critique*
  - There are synthetic *a priori* judgments
  - Mathematics, Science, Metaphysics
- The transcendental aesthetic
  - How objects and the world are given to us
  - Pure intuitions
  - Space and time
    - Transcendental derivation
  - What is given in intuition is messy, lacking conceptual structure.
    - intuitions without concepts are blind
- The transcendental analytic
  - How our minds determine and understand our sense experience
  - We impose our conceptual apparatus on what is given in intuition.
  - The transcendental deduction
    - The categories of the understanding apply necessarily.
    - Schematism: the sensible and intellectual functions of our cognitive capacities align.

# Our Approach to the Analytic

- Categories of the Understanding
- Transcendental Deduction
- The Synthetic Unity of Apperception
- Transcendental Idealism
- Then: the antinomies and the ontological argument

# Four Conditions for the Transcendental Analytic

- (1) The concepts must be pure rather than empirical.
- (2) They must belong not to intuition and sensibility, but to thought and the understanding.
- (3) They must be elementary concepts, and must be distinguished carefully from concepts that are either derivative or composed of such elementary concepts.
- (4) Our table of these concepts must be complete, and the concepts must occupy fully the whole realm of the pure understanding (A64/B89, AW 737b).

# Team Activity

## The Categories of the Understanding

Match the statements to the categories which they exemplify.

- Quantity
    - Unity
    - Plurality
    - Totality
  - Quality
    - Reality
    - Negation
    - Limitation
  - Relation
    - Inherence and Subsistence (substance)
    - Causality
    - Community (Interaction)
  - Modality
    - Possibility and Impossibility
    - Existence and Non-Existence
    - Necessity and Contingency
1. The cat remains on the mat, as it can be neither created nor destroyed.
  2. All of the cats are on the mat.
  3. There is one cat on the mat.
  4. The cat and the mat have relations with each other, including gravitational attraction.
  5. There are many cats on the mat.
  6. The cat must lie on the mat.
  7. Some continuous properties of the cat on the mat (e.g. color or weight) can range from nothingness to any arbitrary value.
  8. The cat could lie on the mat.
  9. If the cat is dropped with from a certain height, it will hit the mat with a calculable force.
  10. The cat is not on the mat.

# The Transcendental Deduction: An Overview

- Intuition presents us with bare appearances.
  - an unordered, unstructured, mess
  - the manifold of representation
- These bare appearances have to be structured in order to be thought.
- We impose concepts, the categories of thought, on the manifold.
- The categories necessarily apply to the manifold given in intuition.
  - The sensible and intellectual functions of our cognitive capacities align.
- Two Stages
  - §15-§21: The categories apply to any being with sensible intuition.
  - §24-§26: They apply to any being with human sensible intuition.


# Van Cleve on the Deduction

1. *The Unity Premise*: All representations of which I am conscious have the unity of apperception.
  2. *The Synthesis Premise*: Representations can have such unity only if they have been synthesized.
  3. *The Category Premise*: Synthesis requires the application of Kant's categories.
- Conclusion*: The categories apply to all representations of which I am conscious.





# The Synthetic Unity of Apperception and the Self



- Raw appearances come to us as an unordered, unstructured, mess.
- The imposition of concepts on that manifold turn that mess into an orderly thought.
- But we must apply the categories on a representation which is already synthesized and orderly.
- So a representation must be synthesized (or combined) in order even to be a thought.
  - ▶ “Combination is representation of the *synthetic* unity of the manifold. Hence this unity cannot arise from the combination; rather by being added to the representation of the manifold, it makes possible the concept of combination in the first place... Hence a category already presupposes combination” (B131, AW 746b).
- A thought thus has a cognizer to perform the combination, as an implicit component.
  - ▶ “The manifold representations given in a certain intuition would not one and all be *my* representations, if they did not one and all belong to one self-consciousness” (B132, AW 746b).

# Team Activity

## The Synthetic Unity of Apperception

- “The understanding is nothing more than the faculty of combining *a priori* and of bringing the manifold of a given intuition under the unity of apperception—the principle of this unity being the supreme principle in all of human cognition” (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B135, AW 747a-b).
- Why does Kant call this the supreme principle of human cognition?
  - A. Because he thought of it.
  - B. Because it shows that the transcendental method of the *Critique of Pure Reason* vindicates Descartes’s *cogito*.
  - C. Because it shows how Aristotle’s categories were incomplete and merely inductive generalizations.
  - D. Because it unifies the faculties of receptivity (intuition) and thought (application of concepts).
  - E. Because it shows that our concepts have both subjective and objective validity.

# Objectivity

- Relations among appearances are not merely arbitrary or accidental.
- We know of causal relations.
- Thus, we must be able to make objective claims about objects, not merely subjective claims.
  - Hume's skepticism was problematic precisely because we do know about causal relations.
  - Balls of uranium and balls of gold
- Instead of opposing subjectivity merely to objectivity, Kant is making a three-part distinction:
  - subjective
  - objective
  - transcendental/noumenal

# Objectivity and the Synthetic Unity of Apperception

- Every act of cognition presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception as an *a priori* condition of judgment.
- It is only by combining representations objectively that relations can hold *a priori* or necessarily.
  - ▶ “Bodies are heavy. By this I do not mean that these representations belong *necessarily to one another* in the empirical intuition. Rather, I mean that they belong to one another *by virtue of the necessary unity* of apperception in the synthesis of intuitions; i.e., they belong to one another according to principles of the objective determination of all representations insofar as these representations can become cognition - all of these principles being derived from the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception” (B142, AW 749b)
- Intuitions become objects for an individual through the synthesis of the manifold.
- But they are still objects.
- We can distinguish between fantasies and appearances
  - ▶ between merely empirical judgments and objective *a priori* ones.

# Form and Content

- So all of our cognitions have these two aspects
  - the matter given in intuition
  - the structure imposed by the understanding (on what is combined in apperception).
- The matter may be pure and *a priori*
  - e.g. when we reflect on the structure of intuition itself
- The matter may be empirical.
  - e.g. as when we have an ordinary sense experience
- The imposition of concepts by the understanding presupposes a self which unites the raw matter and, by doing so, makes it objective.
- The process of turning pure intuition into conceptual content is precisely the application of the categories.

# Limits of the Categories

- Any creature that uses intuition to represent the world will necessarily apply the categories in order to have experiences.
- An infinite mind might, in contrast, work not by representation but by direct awareness.
  - ▶ That mind would have no use for the categories.
- Moreover, we can not explain why we are constructed as we are, with these two aspects of cognition or with these particular categories of understanding or forms of intuition.
- Such questions are unanswerable and any attempt to provide answers extends reason beyond its bounds.
  - ▶ “But why our understanding has this peculiarity, that it brings about unity of apperception *a priori* only by means of the categories, and only by just this kind and number of them - for this no further reason can be given, just as no reason can be given as to why we have just these and no other functions in judging, or why time and space are the only forms of our possible intuition” (B145-6, AW 750b).
- All we can do is describe our experiences and their *a priori* preconditions.
- Such descriptions will have limits.
- They will only describe our experiences and our possible experiences.

# The Categories and Human Sensibility

- The categories apply to any intellect which receives appearances in intuition.
- They apply specifically to our intuition which is sensible in the forms of outer sense (space) and inner sense (time).
- We do not, via abstraction, create the categories.
- Abstracting away from space and time, we find that the categories were presupposed.
  - Again, it's a transcendental argument.
  - What must be the case for us to have the knowledge that we do?
- We discover the categories already imposed on our experiences.
  - “The *possibility of experience* is what provides all our *a priori* cognition with objective reality. Now experience rests on the synthetic unity of appearances, i.e., on a synthesis of appearances in general performed according to concepts of an object. Without such synthesis, experience would not even be cognition, but would be a rhapsody of perceptions (A156/B195, AW 761a).

# Knowledge and Possible Experience

- Since the categories only apply to those with some sort of intuition, any pure concepts will only apply to objects of possible experience.
- Mathematical propositions are not claims about a transcendent (platonistic, say) world.
  - ▶ They hold for objects of possible experience.
  - ▶ “The pure concepts of the understanding, even when they are (as in mathematics) applied to *a priori* intuitions, provide cognition only insofar as these intuitions...can be applied to empirical intuitions... Consequently the categories cannot be used for cognizing things except insofar as these things are taken as objects of possible experience” (B147-8, AW 751a).
  - ▶ Conceptualism
- Even my own existence is known only through the categories and so only as an appearance, not as it is in itself (or noumenally).
  - ▶ “Although my own existence is not appearance (still less mere illusion), determination of my existence can occur only in conformity with the form of inner sense and according to the particular way in which the manifold that I combine is given in inner intuition” (B157-8, AW 752b).
- These are just facts about our cognition, ones we can discover by transcendental analysis (or deduction) and ones which must apply to any cognizer with a separation between intuition and understanding.



# Team Activity

## Making Nature Possible

- We must now explain how it is possible, through *categories*, to cognize *a priori* whatever objects *our senses may encounter*—to so cognize them as regards not the form of their intuition, but the laws of their combination—and hence, as it were, to prescribe laws to nature, and even to make nature possible. For without this suitability of the categories, one would fail to see how everything that our senses may encounter would have to be subject to the laws that arise *a priori* from the understanding alone.
- First of all, let me point out that by *synthesis of apprehension* I mean that combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition whereby perception, i.e. empirical consciousness of the intuition (as appearance), becomes possible.
- We have *a priori*, in the representations of space and time, *forms* of both outer and inner sensible intuition; and to these forms the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold of appearance must always conform, because that synthesis itself can take place only according to this form. But space and time are represented *a priori* not merely as *forms* of sensible intuition, but as themselves *intuitions* (containing a manifold), and hence are represented with the determination of the *unity* of this manifold in them (see the Transcendental Aesthetic). Therefore, even the *unity of the synthesis* of the manifold outside or within us, and hence also a *combination* to which everything that is to be represented determinately in space or time must conform, is already given *a priori* as a condition of the synthesis of all *apprehension*—given along with (not in) these intuitions. This synthetic unity, however, can be none other than the unity of the combination, conforming to the categories but applied to our *sensible intuition*, of the manifold of a given *intuition as such* in an original consciousness. Consequently all synthesis, the synthesis through which even perception becomes possible, is subject to the categories; and since experience is cognition though connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience and hence hold *a priori* also for all objects of experience.
- Hence, e.g., when I turn the empirical intuition of a house into a perception by apprehending the intuition's manifold, then in this apprehension I presuppose the *necessary unity* of space and of outer sensible intuition as such; and I draw, as it were, the house's shape in conformity with this synthetic unity of the manifold in space. But this same unity, if I abstract from the form of space, resides in the understanding, and is the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an intuition as such, i.e. the category of *magnitude*. Hence the synthesis of apprehension, i.e. perception, must conform throughout to that category.

# Idealism

- Appearances conform *a priori* both to the forms of sensible intuition and to the categories of the understanding which combine the manifold.
- Kant's idealism may, at this point, seem prominent.
  - “Just as appearances exist not in themselves but only relatively to the subject in whom the appearances inhere insofar as the subject has senses, so the laws exist not in the appearances but only relatively to that same being insofar as that being has understanding” (B164, AW 754b).
- The forms of intuition meet up with the categories of the understanding in large part because they are both *a priori* impositions of the subject.
- We don't know about the conditions in the noumenal world.
- There may be some lawlike connections.
  - “Things in themselves would have their law-governedness necessarily, even apart from an understanding that cognizes them” (B164, AW 754b).
- But our representations of laws hold for our structured cognition.
- For us, experiences (i.e. appearances of objects in nature) must have certain abstract features.
  - “What connects the manifold of sensible intuition is imagination, and imagination depends on the understanding as regards the unity of its intellectual synthesis, and on sensibility as regards the manifoldness of apprehension” (B164, AW 754b).

# Kantian Idealism and Nativism

- Kant's claim is not the overly dogmatic and (perhaps) implausible claim that the laws of nature are innate.
- Instead, Kant argues that some laws of nature are synthetic *a priori*, arising from the general conditions for experience.
  - ▶ “Nature (regarded merely as nature in general) depends...on the categories as the original basis of its necessary law-governedness. But even the pure faculty of the understanding does not suffice for prescribing *a priori* to appearances, through mere categories, more laws than those underlying a *nature in general* considered as the law-governedness of appearances in space and time. Particular laws, because they concern appearances that are determined empirically, are *not completely derivable* from those laws...” (B165, AW 754b-755a).
- Only the most general laws of nature, those which arise from structuring our experience, can be known *a priori*.
- The categories make experience possible.
  - ▶ Our experience is not whimsical or rhapsodic or fantastic.
  - ▶ It is ordered and structured and lawlike.
  - ▶ Such experience presupposes certain cognitive faculties as conditions, both intuitions and conceptual structure along with a unifying self which we can know, like everything else, only as an object of possible experience and not as it is in itself.

# After the Transcendental Deduction

- Kant explains, or transcendently deduces, all of the particular categories.
- Then, he shows how his transcendental idealism applies to a variety of traditional philosophical problems and paradoxes:
  - the question of the existence of an external world
  - whether space and time are absolute or relational
  - whether we have free will
- In some cases, Kant sides with the rationalists, claiming that we have knowledge.
  - certainty of mathematics
  - knowledge of an external world
- In other cases, Kant finds the rationalists' claims overly dogmatic, exceeding the limits of pure reason.