Class #22 - The Self and Free Will
David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part 4, Section 6 (AW 525-532)
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, VIII-IX (AW 564-576); XII (AW593-600)

We have seen two aspects of Hume's work on induction and science.
The skeptical Hume argues that we have no knowledge of the future or unobserved.
The naturalist Hume presumes our beliefs in universal scientific laws and explains them in terms of our natural psychological capacities or habits.
But to explain is not to justify and the problem of induction persists.
Our next and last two topics, the self and free will, will start from naturalist assumptions.

I. The Self

Locke argues that we can neither identify our selves with our bodies nor our souls, in a traditional sense of 'soul'.
The biological theory of personhood applies the same identity conditions to people as we do to other individual animals.
Locke provides thought experiments, including those of the prince and the cobbler and of the day/night person, which ask us to consider the possibility of transferring and sharing consciousness among biological entities.
Some intuitions support the claim that the self transfers with consciousness and memory.
The person consisting of the cobbler's body and the prince's thoughts is the prince and not the cobbler.
Similar arguments, from Locke, apply to the soul theory.
Given some common views about the soul, that it exists prior to birth and after death, our personhood can be seen to be different from our soul by considering some simple thought experiments.
We can imagine two different souls inhabiting (or whatever the relation is) the same person.
Two different persons can house (or whatever) the same soul.
Instead, Locke argues that we identify with our conscious experiences, linked by memory.
Locke's theory relies on psychological continuity to identify a person over time.

Hume worries that the common notion of self outruns our memories.
There are experiences which it is natural to call mine that I do not remember.

> Memory does not so much *produce* as *discover* personal identity by showing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions. It will be incumbent on those who affirm that memory produces entirely our personal identity to give a reason why we can thus extend our identity beyond our memory (*Treatise* I.4.6, AW 530b).

Berkeley worries that given Locke's constraints on our capacities to acquire beliefs, we have no sense of self.
We sense our bodies, but they are always changing while the self remains constant.
We never sense our selves.
Thus we have no idea of the self, which Berkeley identified with the soul, or of God.

> There can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert... they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts...The words *will*, *soul*, *spirit* do not stand for different ideas or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something which is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be like or represented by any idea

> whatsoever - though it must be admitted at the same time that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind, such as willing, loving, hating, inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of those words (Berkeley, *Principles* §27, AW 452b).

Berkeley abandoned, for these special cases, his strict policy of never admitting an object that was not first in the senses.
He claims that we have notions of the self and God even if we do not have ideas of them.
We posit the self in order to unify our experiences; we posit God as the source of all the ideas.
Esse is *percipi* or *percipere*; to exist is either to be perceived or to perceive.

Hume agrees with Berkeley that we have no impression, and thus no idea, of the self.
But where Berkeley relaxed his epistemic standards and allowed for notions in addition to ideas, Hume stands his ground.
Since we have no idea of the self, we have no reason to believe in any such thing.

> If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same through the whole course of our lives, since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions or from any other that the idea of self is derived, and, consequently, there is no such idea (*Treatise* I.4.6, AW 526a).

If what we mean by the self is some constant substance or property which persists through time, there is no such thing.
There is no underlying, unifying object which we can call the self.
There are just perceptions.

> When I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception and never can observe anything but the perception (Hume 349a-b).

Since Hume denies that there is a self, we can call Hume's theory of self the no-self theory of self.

As I said in the previous notes about induction, whenever a philosophers denies something that people commonly believe, s/he should provide some account of our ordinary beliefs.
Hume provides a psychological account of our unjustified inferential habits to go along with his denial that we have knowledge of inductions.
Hume provides an account of our ordinary beliefs in the self to go along with his denial that we have knowledge of a self.
We can evaluate his no-self theory of the self both on the plausibility of his argument for the theory and on the plausibility of his account of our ordinary experiences.

II. The Bundle Theory

Hume's claim that there is no self relies on his premise that a self should be precisely identical over time.
That claim seems too strong.
As we age and acquire more experiences, we have different properties.

We say that certain experiences are cathartic, that they change us.
That could just be a metaphoric or otherwise non-literal way of speaking.
But perhaps it is serious.
If so, perhaps even small changes to our bodies and minds actually change who we are.
Even having lunch or shifting our bodies slightly to the left changes our relations to the world.
The biological theory of the self accommodates these changes without giving up on an enduring self by relying on the functional organization of the body as a criterion for identity over time.
Another way of looking at the biological theory would be to see the self as a collection of loosely-related individual instances of bodies, each just a moment of time wide.
The self over time would be a bundle of related biological entities.

Hume's account of our ordinary conception of self is similar to this functional view.
Hume argues that we never perceive a self.
But we do have experiences.
So whatever we call ourselves must be related to our series of experiences.
Our experiences are joined by a variety of psychological connections among our ideas: resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect.
These psychological connections govern all of our thoughts.
They do not connect our ideas in some underlying substance.
These psychological capacities merely conjoin our experiences over time.
Even memory, for Locke the essential characteristic of the self, merely demonstrates such conjunctions.
The ordinary notion of self which we are pursuing outruns our memories: there are experiences which I call mine but which I do not remember.
Locke argues that an enduring self requires connections among our memories and other conscious experiences.
Hume claims that we lack secure connections.
We have only a series of loosely-related conjunctions of experiences.

Instead of being a paradigm of unity, Hume thus argues that the self is an exemplar of diversity.
Just as Berkeley argues that the apple is merely a bundle of independent sense experiences, its taste independent from its roundness and its crunch, we are just a collection of various, separate experiences.
As far as we know, even the world itself is just a loose collection of events unconnected by causal laws.
Everything is particular and all the particulars are independent.

> Every distinct perception which enters into the composition of the mind is a distinct existence and is different and distinguishable and separable from every other perception, either contemporary or successive (AW 529b).

The self is dissolved.

> When we attribute identity, in an improper sense, to variable or interrupted objects, our mistake is not confined to the expression, but is commonly attended with a fiction, either of something invariable and uninterrupted, or of something mysterious and inexplicable, or at least with a propensity to such fictions. What will suffice to prove this hypothesis to the satisfaction of every fair enquirer, is to show from daily experience and observation, that the objects, which are variable or interrupted, and yet are supposed to continue the same, are such only as consist of a succession of parts, connected together by resemblance, contiguity, or causation... (AW 527b).

For Hume, then, the self as we ordinarily understand it is just a loose bundle of experiences.

So there are two ways to view Hume's theory of the self.
On the one hand, it is a no-self theory because he denies any experience of a self.
On the other hand, we can call it the bundle theory of self for his claim about our loose connections.
That latter name is a bit misleading, since it might be interpreted as claiming that there is a self which ties the bundle together.
We can have a practical interest in maintaining a notion of the self over time.
But the claim that there is a self underlying the experiences, some haecceity, is, strictly speaking, false.
There is no I, beyond the experiences.

Hume's claim that there is no self is similar to the Buddhist view.
On the Hume-Buddha view, Descartes's claim that the cogito yields the existence of a thinker is too strong.
We can not claim that a self exists.
We are just thought.

Hume was not fully satisfied with his destructive account of personal identity, as you can see in his Appendix, AW 531-2.
He did not return to the topic in the *Enquiry*.
It might have been too skeptical a conclusion even for Hume.

III. Compatibilism

We have talked quite a bit about free will and determinism in this course so far.
Consider three broad kinds of positions on free will.

FW1	Libertarianism: our will is free
FW2	Determinism: our will is not free, but determined
FW3	Compatibilism: we are both free and determined

Note that 'libertarianism' in this context is not the political position of the same name.
Also note that libertarianism and determinism are what we call incompatibilist positions.
If we have libertarian freedom, then the world is not determined.
If the world is determined, then we are not libertarian-free.

The problem of free will arises because we have reasons to believe both that we are free and that we are determined.
For freedom, our conscious experience feels free.
We don't feel the causal pressure of the past on our actions in the way that we feel restricted by the laws of nature when we try, say, to dunk a basketball.
There are two routes to determinism.
The theistic route refers to an omniscient and benevolent God,
The causal route, sometime called the Laplacean argument, refers to deterministic laws of physics.
Descartes is a libertarian, attributing our ability to err to our freedom.
To avoid determinism, the libertarian must show that the future is not fixed.
As Spinoza noted, a free, undetermined future seems inconsistent with an omniscient God or strictly deterministic laws of physics.
Some contemporary philosophers try to make room for freedom by appealing to the indeterminacy of quantum physics.

But quantum indeterminacy does not seem to rise to the observable level.
Moreover, the deterministic-seeming laws of physics do not suffer from the random indeterminacies we find at the quantum level.
Our freedom does not seem to consist of random moments inconsistent with the laws.
Our freedom is rooted in our ability to choose among various options.

Given (or despite) our feeling of freedom, the determinist (e.g. Spinoza) tries to show that our belief in our free will is illusory.
Appearances of free will may be due to a lack of understanding of the laws and the initial conditions.
Or they can be attributed to the inability of a finite mind to comprehend the infinitude of God.

Determinism seems troubling and not just because of the unpleasant and counterintuitive thought that I don't have the freedom I appear to have.
Determinism seems to undermine our ordinary notions of moral responsibility.
Many people believe that we are morally responsible only for behavior that we could have avoided; we are not responsible when we have no ability to do otherwise.
On this natural view, I am not personally responsible for stopping climate change because I can not personally do so.
I am not responsible for, say, tidying up the surface of Jupiter or preventing the great Chicago fire of 1871, since the laws of physics prevent me from doing anything about them.
On the other hand, since I can contribute, in some way, to the reduction of carbon in our atmosphere, say by walking to work or lowering my thermostat in winter or encouraging my College to divest from fossil fuels, I may be responsible for contributing to the effort to mitigate problems of climate change.
We hold children and psychotics to different standards because we take them to be unable to control their behavior like ordinary adults.
But if determinism is true and it entails that I too can not do otherwise than what I do, it seems that I can never be morally responsible for any of my actions.
Intuitively, we do think people are morally responsible for some of their actions.
Determinism clashes with these intuitions.

Leibniz, like Spinoza, rejects Descartes's libertarianism and argues for determinism.
But Leibniz argues that free will and determinism are compatible.
Compatibilism is the view that determinism is not, contrary to appearance, opposed to free will.
Hume is another compatibilist, but of a different sort from Leibniz.

As we saw in the discussion of miracles, Hume accepts that there are strictly deterministic laws, that there is no chance in nature.

> It is universally allowed that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a necessary force and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted from it (*Enquiry*, §VIII.1, AW 565b).

Hume pursues this deterministic line of reasoning through to human actions.
People do not generally surprise us with their actions.
When they do surprise us, it is due to our own ignorance rather than any real unpredictability in their behavior.

> The philosopher, if he is consistent, must apply the same reasoning to the actions and volitions of intelligent agents. The most irregular and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently be

> accounted for by those who know every particular circumstance of their character and situation (*Enquiry*, §VIII.1, 568a).

Given Hume's determinism, or what he calls necessity, it seems odd that he could also hold that we have free will, which he calls liberty.
As we have seen, free will seems directly opposed to determinism.
Hume claims that the dispute between libertarians and determinists is mainly verbal, since the freedom that we really care about is not in fact opposed to determinism.

Hume's claim is that the term 'freedom' is ambiguous.
In one sense, 'freedom' is opposed to (or is incompatible with) 'determinism', or 'necessity'.
That's Descartes's libertarian freedom.
Hume claims that libertarian freedom is unavailable and undesirable.
If our actions were free in this sense, we would have no reasons for acting at all.
Our acts would be random and chaotic.
What's even worse for the traditional libertarian is that our acts would seem to be blameless since they do not proceed determined from our will.
We only hold people responsible for their actions when they are done intentionally.
We do not hold the lion morally culpable for killing the wildebeest.
Similarly, we should not blame the person whose actions, even if bad, are undetermined.

> The actions themselves may be blamable; they may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion. But the person is not answerable for them and, as they proceeded from nothing in him that is durable and constant and leave nothing of that nature behind them, it is impossible he can, upon their account, become the object of punishment or vengeance. According to the principle, therefore, which denies necessity, and consequently causes, a man is as pure and untainted after having committed the most horrid crime as at the first moment of his birth, nor is his character any way concerned in his actions, since they are not derived from it, and the wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof of the depravity of the other (*Enquiry*, §VIII.2, 572b).

Hume thus argues that libertarian freedom prevents ascriptions of moral responsibility in the same way that determinism does.
Since both incompatibilist concepts undermine moral responsibility, we should look for a different sense of 'freedom'.

In its proper sense, Hume claims, 'freedom' should be contrasted with 'constraint'.
That is, an action is done freely when it is done without external constraint: if I am not dragged, pushed, or held at gunpoint to perform it.

> For what is meant by liberty when applied to voluntary actions? We cannot surely mean that actions have so little connection with motives, inclinations, and circumstances that one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other and that one affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the other. For these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact. By liberty, then, we can only mean *a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will* - that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains (*Enquiry*, §VIII.1, AW 571a).

For Hume, then, if I do something only because I could not have done otherwise, I do not do it freely.

I do not return to the ground when I jump in the air of my free will; I could not have done otherwise in that case.
More importantly, if I pay my taxes because I am afraid of being fined or imprisoned, or if I refrain from cheating only out of fear of punishment, or if I am forced by threat to do any action I do not wish to perform, I do not act freely.
On the other hand, if I want to pay taxes, since I approve of their uses in building and maintaining roads, schools, and armed forces; or if I refrain from cheating because I believe it to be wrong, then I am acting in accordance with my will, freely.
Consequently, we can hold people morally responsible for those acts they perform freely, in Hume's sense, and not for those they perform under constraint.

By focusing on a sense of 'freedom' that is not opposed to determinism, Hume makes free will compatible with determinism.
He also makes both free will and determinism compatible with ascriptions of moral responsibility.
He allows us an account of moral responsibility which aligns with our belief that we are responsible only for that which we choose.
Hume's definition is consistent with the doctrine that ought implies can, that our moral responsibilities do not exceed our powers.
Everyone should be happy.

IV. Worries About Compatibilism

The reflective determinist may be unsatisfied with Hume's definition of 'freedom'.
Hume seems not to take into account any constraints on our will.
The determinist can pursue the question of whether we are free or determined by asking whether we are free to choose what we choose.
If our thoughts are themselves the products of physical processes, mainly brain processes along with their perceptual inputs, then the problem of determinism recurs with regard to our will.
Our will itself seems to be determined.
Our actions may be in accord with our will, but we are prevented from willing freely.
If our wills are constrained, then there is a sense in which we are not free even if we are not under external constraint.
We excuse children from legal responsibility because we think that they are not free to choose otherwise, even when they are not constrained by an external force.
Similarly, we excuse people with various mental illnesses when we believe that their illnesses prevent a free choice, again even in the absence of external constraints.
We do not make such excuses for ordinary adults, who we suppose to be free.

But the differences between adults, on the one hand, and children and people with dementia, on the other, may not be as significant as is ordinarily assumed.
As psychology progresses, we find an increasing number of phenomena considered to be mental illnesses.
Mental disorders are standardly listed by the American Psychiatric Association in the Diagnostics and Standards Manual, or DSM, the fifth edition of which was recently released.
Since the original DSM was produced in 1952, the number of disorders listed has tripled, and the size of the manual has increased seven-fold.
Some characteristics, like homosexuality, have been removed from the DSM.
But the overwhelming trend is toward greater diagnoses of disorders.
There is an interesting controversy over the methods being used to develop the DSM-V.

As a result of increased diagnoses of mental disorders, more of our actions are seen as the result of mental predispositions than as the result of free choice.
Neuroscientific progress and advances in genetics have also increased the number of phenomena for which scientific theories can account in the absence of any role for free will.
Presumably, such scientific progress will include, eventually, substantial predictive power.
Advances in fMRI technology have allowed machines to begin to read our thoughts by scanning our brains.

It would be difficult to maintain, as the compatibilist does, that we are free if a computer can predict our behavior.
Scientific advances seem to provide a challenge to the compatibilist.
We reduce our ascriptions of moral responsibility when a subject's actions can be predicted.
The absence of free will implied by the predictability of our actions seems to excuse.
That is the essence of incompatibilism.

The following contemporary considerations may help illuminate Hume's view of free will.
Harry Frankfurt argues for an updated version of Hume's compatibilism.
Frankfurt notes that we are inclined to endorse the principle of alternate possibilities, PAP.

> PAP A person's act is free if and only if that person could have done otherwise.

On PAP, if determinism is true and incompatible with free will, no one ever could have done otherwise.
No one ever acts freely.
And, thus, no one can be morally responsible in a deterministic universe.
Frankfurt rejects PAP and argues that one can be morally responsible even if one could not have done otherwise.
He presents the example of $Jones_4$, which seems to provide a counterexample to PAP.

> Suppose someone — Black, let us say — wants $Jones_4$ to perform a certain action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until $Jones_4$ is about to make up his mind what to do, and does nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that $Jones_4$ is going to decide to do something other than what he wants him to do. If it does become clear that $Jones_4$ is going to decide to do something else, Black takes effective steps to ensure that $Jones_4$ decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants him to do... Now suppose that Black never has to show his hand because $Jones_4$, for reasons of his own, decides to perform and does perform the very action Black wants him to perform. In that case, it seems clear, $Jones_4$ will bear precisely the same moral responsibility for what he does as he would have borne if Black had not been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it. It would be quite unreasonable to excuse $Jones_4$ for his action...on the basis of the fact that he could not have done otherwise. This fact played no role at all in leading him to act as he did... Indeed, everything happened just as it would have happened without Black's presence in the situation and without his readiness to intrude into it (Harry Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," 835-6).

It seems as if $Jones_4$ could not have done otherwise because Black was prepared to force him to act.
But $Jones_4$ still bears moral responsibility.
Thus we have a case in which someone bears responsibility despite not being able to do otherwise, which PAP denies.

Note that Black, in Frankfurt's example, is a stand-in for the laws of physics.
He is what ensures that $Jones_4$ could not do otherwise.
While Black does not impel $Jones_4$ to act, he ensures that $Jones_4$ can not do otherwise.
Frankfurt has shown PAP false without impugning the more plausible claim that moral responsibility is excluded by coercion.
If we are truly coerced, we are not morally culpable for our actions.
But there are cases, like that of $Jones_4$, in which we can not do otherwise and yet we are morally responsible.
The question, if one accepts Frankfurt's claims, is to determine what other, real-world cases are relevantly similar to that of $Jones_4$.
We will not pursue that question.

Hume and Frankfurt both argue that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism.
That's useful for both the determinist and the compatibilist, both of whom accept that we can not do other that what we do.
It does not settle the question of whether we have free will in the libertarian sense.
That is, the compatibilist recovers moral responsibility while avoiding the metaphysical question about freedom.

V. Skepticism and Practice

The empiricists of the modern era believed that they could limit the extravagant speculations of the continental rationalists by paying close attention to our epistemic capacities.
As early as Hobbes, we saw attention paid to psychological matters, especially the principles governing the connections of our ideas.
Hobbes's analogy of the water on the table is meant to illuminate the way in which our thoughts are connected.
Locke claims that our ideas of reflection are those produced by memory, comparison, augmentation, and abstraction.
Hume claims that the connections among ideas are exhausted by the three categories of resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect relations.
These are all rather nascent theories of mind.
Philosophy of mind throughout the modern era is characterized by a representational theory in which we apprehend only our ideas, which may or may not stand for objects external to us.
The representational theory may be contrasted with Aristotle's theory of direct perception in which we are immediately acquainted with the external world.
For all of the moderns, our experience of the world is mediated by our ideas.
The representational theory leads to the Lockean veil of ideas; we are cut off from the external world.
The empiricists, who all agreed with Locke that the contents of the mind arise from sense experience, thought of ideas as pictures in the mind, like a movie in which the external world is duplicated.
But even Descartes held the representational theory.
One claim of lasting importance in Descartes's work is his separation of thought from sensation; our ideas need not be sense impressions.
That is the point of the chiliagon example in the Fifth Meditation: we know about the chiliagon without having anything like a clear and distinct sense idea of it.
Indeed, it is helpful to think of Descartes's criterion as clear and distinct conception rather then perception.
Still, Descartes thought of ideas, whether sensory or pure, as representations of an external world.

Both Berkeley and Hume may be read, in retrospect, as *reductio* arguments on the representational theory of mind, though of course they did not think of their work in that way.
Berkeley shows that this theory of mind, coupled with our sensory apparatus, gives us no reason to believe in a material world.
Hume, as we have seen, shows that the combination gives us no reason to believe that we have knowledge of the laws of nature.

Hume recommends a practical response to the skeptical problem.
We have no evidence for our beliefs in laws governing an external world but we proceed as if the world exists as we perceive it.
Berkeley decried skepticism as an immoral philosophy.
Hume denies that skepticism leads to immorality.
Indeed, his account of free will is constructed precisely to rehabilitate the concept of moral responsibility in response to problems with incompatibilist formulations.

The philosopher who seeks universal truths will be frustrated by Hume's approach.
But we can just ignore the skeptical questions.

> The abstruse philosophy, being founded on a turn of mind which cannot enter into business and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade and comes into open day, nor can its principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and behavior. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our passions, the vehemence of our affections, dissipate all its conclusions and reduce the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian (*Enquiry*, §I, AW 534a-b).

Skepticism is practically defeasible if not philosophically eliminable.

> The great subverter of *Pyrrhonism*, or the excessive principles of skepticism, is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life. These principles may flourish and triumph in the schools, where it is indeed difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade an by the presence of the real objects which actuate our passions and sentiments are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke and leave the most determined skeptic in the same condition as other mortals (*Enquiry*, §XII.2, AW 597b).

Extreme skepticism is self-refuting.

> The Cartesian doubt...were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature (as plainly it is not) would be entirely incurable and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject (*Enquiry*, §XII.1, AW 593a).

> A Pyrrhonian cannot expect that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind or, if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease, and men remain in a total lethargy until the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence (*Enquiry*, §XII.2, AW 598a).

Hume's skepticism is a philosophical position, not a practical one.
We leave through the door rather than through the window despite having no justification for our actions.

Despite such claims, Hume's work has long been deemed excessively skeptical.
Some contemporary research on Hume minimizes the importance of skepticism to his greater goals.
Many philosophers see him as the intellectual ancestor of today's naturalists.
Instead of arguing for skepticism, we can see Hume as trying to develop a science of human nature, of psychology, using the success of physical science as a paradigm.
This view of Hume's work, while not obviously the best interpretation of his words, has been fruitful.

In contemporary philosophy of mind, substantial attention has been paid to the nature of ideas, and to the language of thought.
If you are interested in such questions, you should pursue courses in the philosophy of mind and in the philosophy of language.
The modern era has one last gasp.
Kant thinks that he can find his way through the haze by adopting a transcendental method of arguing.
We will spend a few classes attempting to assimilate the various themes of our course in the remaining panel presentations.
Then we will look briefly at Kant's attempt to reconcile some of the competing views.