THE BUNDLE THEORY OF SELF

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OVERVIEW

I. Review on impressions and ideas
II. Locke vs. Hume
III. Hume's view on personal identity – There is no self
IV. The Bundle theory of Self
V. Buddhist Philosophy
VI. Discuss questions

REVIEW ON IDEAS AND IMPRESSIONS

Impression	Idea
"By the term impression , then, I mean all	"And impressions are distinguished from
our more lively perceptions, when we	ideas, which are the less lively
hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or	perceptions, of which we are conscious,
desire, or will" (Enquiry, II, AW 539a)	when we reflect on any of those sensations
	or movements above mentioned" (Enquiry,
	II, AW 539a)
=> An impression is a sensation, a vibrant	=> An idea is the thought of that burning
idea, like a hand on a burning stove, or the	sensation ten minutes later
sound of a voice.	



RULE:

All knowledge must trace back to original impressions

LOCKE VS. HUME

Locke	Hume
Relies on psychological continuity to	 Disagrees because there are experiences
identify a person over time - Consciousness	which I call mine that I do not
- The person consisting of the Cobbler's	remember. He rejects the notion of one continuous
body + Prince's thoughts = Prince – not	substance – that is consciousness –
Cobbler.	because we cannot really comprehend it.

"Memory does not so much *produce* as *discover* personal identity by showing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions. It will be incumbent on those who affirm that memory produces entirely our personal identity to give a reason why we can thus extend our identity beyond our memory" (*Treatise* I.4.6, AW 530b).



Therefore, Hume rejects Locke's idea of CONSCIOUSNESS because we can never perceive consciousness, nor can we trace back to the origin of consciousness.

The major difference between Hume and Locke is the severity with which Hume invokes his empiricist limitations.

SELF IS OUR PERCEPTIONS

- We are composed of different perceptions. Our selves have to be made up of different perceptions about the world.

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death and could I neither think nor feel nor see nor love nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is further requisite to make me a perfect nonentity" (*Treatise* I.4.6, AW 526a).

BUT WE HAVE NO CONSTANT IMPRESSION OF THE SELF.....

"It must be some one impression that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same through the whole course of our lives, since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions or from any other that the idea of self is derived, and, consequently, there is no such idea" (*Treatise* I.4.6, AW 526a)



- **<u>Premise:</u>** The self must be precisely identical over time

- We have different properties over time
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, there is no self

WHAT ARE WE?

- We are a collection of loosely-related individual instances of selves, each just a moment of time wide


- We are composed of our series of experiences

- Our experiences are joined by a variety of psychological connections among our ideas: resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect
- Hume rejects an underlying haecceity for the connections among theory: there is only a series of loosely-related conjunctions of experiences
 - There is no I, beyond the experiences

- Fiona and Shrek:

- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vNTdL1IUi_Y&feature=related

- (haecceity: the property of being a unique and individual thing)




- 1. Reject the permanent existence of psychophysical elements, which make up humans. => Reject the continuity of an identical substance in humans
 - 2. Instead, he proposes the *mind-stream continuity*. (Candle example)
 - 3. Mindstream is an English translation of a Buddhist philosophical technical term for the moment-to-moment 'continuity' of awareness



 If the connections between psychological states are merely conjunctions, why would someone not think of himself as someone else the next instant? What makes him think of himself as an entity?

2. What accounts for reasons/rationality?

- 3. Is his premise, that the self must be precisely identical over time, sound?
- 4. What about the conjoined twins? They experience the same thing, so are they one self?





SOURCE

1. Prof. Russell Marcus

- 2. Locke, John. An essay concerning Human Understanding. Ed. Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins
 - 3. Hume, David. A treatise of Human Nature. Ed. Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins
 - 4. Banham, Gary. Locke and Hume on Personal Identity.

5. Kant, Immanuel.

- 6. <u>http://niyamak.wordpress.com/2008/05/21/concept-of-self-in-hume-and-buddha/</u>
 - 7. Plato Stanford Encyclopedia