

Reading Guide #7

Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (AW 717-783)

These questions are provided to assist you in your reading. I encourage you first to read the material through, then go back to answer the questions. You are not expected to hand in written answers. You are expected to have responses ready for class discussion. Page numbers refer to the Ariew and Watkins collection.

*Prefaces and Introduction* (AW 717-729)

1. What, according to Kant, is a critique of pure reason?
2. What is logic? How are its limitations to its benefit as a science?
3. Distinguish theoretical and practical cognition. How might reason make its object actual, in addition to determining it?
4. What characterizes mathematics and physics as secure, as opposed to contingent, sciences?
5. Does our cognition conform to objects, or do objects conform to our cognition? Explain. Consider Copernicus's revolution.
6. Can we cognize beyond the limits of possible experience? Explain.
7. Why are topics like God, freedom, and immortality inaccessible to reason? How does Kant deny knowledge in order to make room for faith?
8. Distinguish analytic and synthetic judgments. Why are experiential judgments all synthetic?
9. How is 'every effect has a cause' synthetic? How is it *a priori*?
10. How are some mathematical propositions synthetic *a priori*?
11. How are a few mathematical propositions analytic? Provide examples.
12. How are metaphysical propositions synthetic *a priori*?
13. How does Kant disagree with Hume about mathematics? How does the disagreement provide hope for mathematics?
14. What is transcendent cognition?
15. Distinguish sensibility from understanding.

*Transcendental Aesthetic* (AW 729-737)

16. What are intuitions? How do they differ from concepts?
17. Distinguish the matter of appearances from their form. How is the form of an intuition known *a priori*? What are the properties of pure intuitions?
18. Describe the steps from an empirical intuition to a transcendental aesthetic, from thinking of a particular object to considering the pure form of sensibility.
19. What is inner sense? What does it give us?
20. Is space an abstraction from outer experiences? How does it underlie outer experiences?
21. How is space an intuition, rather than a concept?
22. What is a transcendental exposition of a concept? How does Kant provide a transcendental exposition of space?
23. Are things-in-themselves in space? Explain.
24. How is space both real and ideal?
25. How does Kant argue that our knowledge of time cannot be obtained from experience?
26. Why is time a pure form of intuition, and not a universal concept?
27. How is a pure intuition of time a necessary condition of the possibility of cognition?

28. How is time a subjective condition of our intuition? How is it objective in regard to appearances? (I.e. how is time empirically real but transcendently ideal?)
29. What objections arise against taking space and time to be either real in themselves or inherent in external objects?

*Transcendental Analytic: Analytic of Concepts (AW 737-756)*

30. "Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind" (A51/B76, AW 737b). Explain.
31. What is the goal of the transcendental analytic? Why must its table of concepts be complete?
32. How do concepts rest on function?
33. How is synthesis of a manifold what first gives rise to cognition? What is pure synthesis?
34. Describe the twelve categories, the pure concepts of the understanding. Indicate the four classes of categories.
35. What is the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding? How is it different from an empirical deduction?
36. How does Kant praise and criticize Locke regarding a deduction of pure concepts of the understanding?
37. How can appearances be given in intuition without functions of the understanding? What difficulty does this situation cause, for Kant?
38. How does Kant seek a middle path between the works of Locke and Hume?
39. "[The categories] are concepts of an object in general whereby the object's intuition is regarded as *determined* in terms of one of the *logical functions* in judging" (B128, AW 745b). Explain.
40. What is a combination of the manifold of representations? How is it missing from a merely sensible intuition?
41. How does the concept of combination carry with it the concept of the unity of a manifold?
42. Describe the principle of the synthetic unity of apperception. How is it the supreme principle of human understanding?
43. How is the transcendental unity of apperception objective? How is the empirical unity subjective?
44. Distinguish 'if I support this body, then I feel a pressure of heaviness' from 'this body is heavy'. Which is objectively valid?
45. How does Kant argue that the manifold in an intuition is necessarily subject to the categories? For what kind of being would the categories not apply?
46. How does Kant show that the categories apply only to objects of possible experience? What does this entail for mathematical objects?
47. In what way does the imagination work *a priori*? In what sense is it empirical?
48. Why do we only have cognition of ourselves as appearances?
49. How could the applicability of the categories make nature possible?
50. How are space and time as objects different from space and time as forms of intuition? How does this difference support the claim that the categories hold *a priori* for all objects of experience?
51. What is the difference between an empirical intuition and a perception? Be specific.
52. How, generally, does Kant reach the category of magnitude by abstracting from space? How does he reach the category of relation of effects and causes by abstracting from time?
53. "How can the categories determine *a priori* the combination of nature's manifold without gleaning that combination from nature?" (B163, AW 754b). Explain.
54. Are particular laws of nature derivable from the categories alone? Explain.
55. Does the deduction of the categories show merely that we are built so that we cannot think of representations without them?

*Refutation of Idealism* (AW 781-783)

56. Distinguish dogmatic idealism from problematic idealism. How does Kant reject dogmatic idealism?
57. How does Kant reject problematic idealism?
58. Why is the determination of my existence in time only possible through the existence of actual things?
59. Why is inner experience only mediate, not immediate as Descartes had alleged?
60. Does Kant's refutation of idealism prove the veridicality of all outer experience? Explain.

*Antinomies* (AW 792-804)

61. Contrast the thesis and antithesis of the first antinomy, concerning whether the universe is infinite.
62. How does Kant argue that the universe has a beginning in time? How does he argue that it does not have a beginning in time?
63. How does Kant argue that the universe is spatially bound? How does he argue that it is spatially infinite?
64. What are simples? Contrast the thesis and antithesis of the second antinomy, concerning whether there are simples.
65. How does Kant argue that there are simples? How does he argue that there are no simples?
66. How are mathematical proofs insights into the character of space?
67. How do monadists invert the relation between space and objects in space?
68. Contrast the thesis and antithesis of the third antinomy, concerning freedom.
69. How does Kant argue that we have free will (transcendental freedom)? How does he argue that our actions are all determined?
70. How would transcendental freedom make nature vanish?
71. What is the cosmological (dialectical) syllogism? How does it apply to the antinomies?
72. What false assumption underlies the first antinomy, concerning whether the universe is infinite? How does removing this assumption resolve the antinomy?
73. How does consideration of the antinomies support the transcendental ideality of appearances?

*On the Ontological Argument* (AW 819-823)

74. How does the difference between judgments and things help reveal a flaw in the ontological argument?
75. Is 'God exists' analytic or synthetic? Explain.
76. What is Kant's distinction between a logical predicate and a real predicate? Why is 'is omnipotent' a real predicate, while 'exists' is merely a logical predicate?
77. "A hundred real thalers do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers" (A599/B627, AW 822a). Explain. Why not?
78. How does Kant's distinction between logical and real predicates demonstrate a flaw in the ontological argument?