

Reading Guide #24 - Autonomy Platonism

Russell Marcus, "Chapter 9: Two Versions of Autonomy Platonism, §3-§7"

1. Describe the two constraints on autonomy platonism.
2. Describe McEvoy's sketch. What two tasks remain to develop it into an epistemology?
3. What is a mathematical intuition?
4. How does mathematical intuition mediate recognition of the modal character of mathematical belief?
5. What does taking intuition to be an *a priori* method of belief acquisition entail?
6. Are mathematical claims necessarily true? Explain.
7. Can empirical methods of belief acquisition yield mathematical beliefs? Explain.
8. How do mathematical intuitions differ from beliefs?
9. Describe Cheyne's argument against mathematical intuition. How does he distinguish intuition from conceptual knowledge?
10. Could mathematical intuition be unreliable? Explain.
11. Is mathematical intuition amenable to scientific investigation? Explain.
12. Is the variability of people's mathematical intuitions a problem for intuition-based autonomy platonism? Explain.
13. How are intuition-based autonomy platonism and mind-body dualism similar views? How are they different?
14. What is Russell's view of the relationship between our beliefs in the axioms of mathematics and our beliefs in mathematical theories?
15. What three tools guide the construction of mathematical theories?
16. In what two ways can intuition steer us wrong in constructing mathematical theories?
17. Describe the method of seeking reflective equilibrium in mathematics. What is its relationship to ordinary mathematical methods?
18. What is the access problem? How does Quine's approach to ontology solve the access problem?
19. How is the argument for intuition-based autonomy platonism an inference to the best explanation?
20. How might the argument for intuition-based autonomy platonism be circular?