- If [geometry's] subjects happen to be sensible, though it does not treat them *qua* sensible, the mathematical sciences will not for that reason be sciences of sensibles - nor, on the other hand, of other things separate from sensibles (*Metaphysics* XIII.3: 1078a2-4).

- It is true...to say, without qualification, that the objects of mathematics exist, and with the character ascribed to them by mathematicians...If we suppose things separated from their attributes and make any inquiry concerning them as such, we shall not for this reason be in error, any more than when one draws a line on the ground and calls it a foot long when it is not; for the error is not included in the propositions (*Metaphysics* XIII.3: 1077b31 - 1078a17).

- The best way of studying geometry is to separate the geometrical properties of objects and to posit objects that satisfy these properties alone...Though this is a fiction, it is a helpful fiction rather than a harmful one: for, at bottom, geometers are talking about existing things and properties they really have... (Lear 175).