Reading Guide #21 - The Explanatory Indispensability Argument Alan Baker, "Are There Genuine Mathematical Explanations of Physical Phenomena?" Paolo Mancosu, "Explanation In Mathematics," §1 - §3

Baker

- 1. How is 'indispensability for science' vague? How do indispensabilists avoid the problem?
- 2. Why is explanation important for the indispensability argument? What kinds of explanations are important?
- 3. According to Colyvan, how does mathematics help explain the pressure-temperature antipodes? How is Colyvan's explanation really a prediction?
- 4. How does Melia criticize Colyvan's two relativity examples?
- 5. How is the use of geometrical explanations to support Colyvan's indispensability thesis controversial?
- 6. How does Baker criticize Melia's reliance on a causal principle of explanation?
- 7. What is the goal of Baker's article? How does the cicada example support that goal?
- 8. What are two explanations of the prime-numbered year cicada life-cycle length? How do they involve mathematical facts?
- 9. What three criteria should a mathematical explanation of a physical phenomenon meet? Are they met in the cicada case?
- 10. How does Baker interpret Melia's challenge for his cicada example?
- 11. Why doesn't a casual account of explanation help decide whether explanation is truly mathematical?
- 12. What is a deductive-nomological account of explanation? Does it allow for mathematical explanations?
- 13. What is a pragmatic account of explanation? Does it allow for mathematical explanations?
- 14. How does Baker's cicada case avoid Melia's charge that some purported mathematical explanations of physical phenomena rely on arbitrary properties of mathematical objects?
- 15. How does Baker's case avoid the ambiguity that infected Colyvan's geometric cases?
- 16. Are there genuine mathematical explanations of physical phenomena? Explain.

Mancosu

- 1. What is the honeycomb conjecture? How does it rely on mathematical facts?
- 2. How are Mancosu's four examples contrary to the claim that all explanations in the sciences must be causal?
- 3. What is the explanatory indispensability argument (§3.2)?
- 4. How does Steiner (preemptively) reject the explanatory indispensability argument?
- 5. How to Lyon and Colyvan press the challenge to the dispensabilist (Field)?