

Quote Identifications

1. How do words *refer* to sensations? - There doesn't seem to be any problem here; don't we talk about sensations every day, and give them names? But how is the connexion between the name and the thing named set up? This question is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations? - of the word "pain" for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour. "So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?" On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it. (Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §244)
2. Propositions of the form "the so-and-so is the so-and-so" are not always true: it is necessary that the so-and-so" should exist... It is false that the present King of France is the present King of France, or that the round square is the round square. When we substitute a description for a name, propositional functions which are "always true" may become false, if the description describes nothing. There is no mystery in this as soon as we realize... that when we substitute a description the result is not a value of the propositional function in question. (Russell, "Descriptions")
3. "The king of France is wise", is certainly significant; but this does not mean that any particular use of it is true or false. We use it truly or falsely when we use it to talk about some one; when, in using the expression, "The king of France", we are in fact mentioning some one. The fact that the sentence and the expression, respectively, are significant just is the fact that the sentence could be used, in certain circumstances, to say something true or false, that the expression could be used, in certain circumstances to mention a particular person; and to know their meaning is to know what sort of circumstances these are. (Strawson, "On Referring")
4. Uncritical semantics is the myth of a museum in which the exhibits are meanings and the words are labels. To switch languages is to change the labels. (Quine, "Ontological Relativity")
5. It is natural, now, to think of there being connected with a sign (name, combination of words, letter), besides that to which the sign refers, which may be called the reference of the sign, also what I should like to call the sense of the sign, wherein the mode of presentation is contained. In our example, accordingly, the reference of the expressions 'the point of inter-section of a and b' and 'the point of intersection of b and c' would be the same, but not their senses. The reference of 'evening star' would be the same as that of 'morning star,' but not the sense. (Frege, "On Sense and Reference")
6. Since words are only names for things, it would be more convenient for all men to carry about them such things as were necessary to express a particular business they are to discourse on. (Swift, "Getting Rid of Words")

7. When I make a statement about Moses, am I always ready to substitute some one of these descriptions for "Moses"? I shall perhaps say: By "Moses" I understand the man who did what the Bible relates of Moses, or at any rate a good deal of it. But how much? Have I decided how much must be proved false for me to give up my proposition as false? Has the name "Moses" got a fixed and unequivocal use for me in all possible cases? - Is it not the case that I have, so to speak, a whole series of props in readiness, and am ready to lean on one if another should be taken from under me and vice versa? (Wittgenstein, "On Moses")

8. It is misleading to speak of the empirical content of an individual statement - especially if it is a statement at all remote from the experiential periphery of the field. Furthermore it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on experience, and analytic statements, which hold come what may. Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. Even a statement very close to the periphery can be held true in the face of recalcitrant experience by pleading hallucination or by amending certain statements of the kind called logical laws. Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision. (Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism")

9. There might be a possible world in which, a possible counterfactual situation in which, 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' weren't names of the things they in fact are names of. Someone, if he did determine their reference by identifying descriptions, might even have used the very identifying descriptions we used. But still that's not a case in which Hesperus wasn't Phosphorus. For there couldn't have been such a case, given that Hesperus is Phosphorus (Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*)

10. The firmest proof is obviously the purely logical, which, prescind from the particularity of things, is based solely on the laws on which all knowledge rests. Accordingly, we divide all truths that require justification into two kinds, those whose proof can be given purely logically and those whose proof must be grounded on empirical facts. But there is no inconsistency in a proposition belonging to the first kind and yet being such that it can never be apprehended by a human mind without the operation of the senses. (Frege, *Begriffsschrift*)

11. A statement is held to be literally meaningful if and only if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable (Ayer, "Principle of Verification")

12. The only difference between rabbits, undetached rabbit parts, and rabbit stages is in their individuation. If you take the total scattered portion of the spatiotemporal world that is made up of rabbits, and that which is made up of undetached rabbit parts, and that which is made up of rabbit stages, you come out with the same scattered portion of the world each of the three times. The only difference is in how you slice it. And how to slice it is what ostension or simple conditioning, however persistently repeated, cannot teach. (Quine, "Ontological Relativity")

13. Proper names are not connotative; they denote the individuals who are called by them, but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals. When we name a child by the name Paul or a dog by the name Caesar, these names are simply marks used to enable those individuals to be made subjects of discourse. (Mill, "Of Names")

14. I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked “five red apples”. He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked “apples”; then he looks up the word “red” in a table and finds a colour sample opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers—I assume that he knows them by heart—up to the word “five” and for each number he takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.—It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words.—“But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word ‘red’ and what he is to do with the word ‘five’?”—Well, I assume that he acts as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere.—But what is the meaning of the word “five”?—No such thing was in question here, only how the word “five” is used. (Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §1)

15. In order to know that there is no round square, I must make a judgment about the round square. If physics, physiology, and psychology agree in asserting the so-called ideal character of sense-qualities, they implicitly assert something about color as well as about sound, namely, that the one exists no more than the other. Those who like paradoxical modes of expression could very well say: “There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects.” The fact, familiar the world over, which is meant by this statement throws such a bright light on the relation of objects to reality, or their relation to being, generally, that a somewhat closer examination of the matter, which is of fundamental importance in its own right, is entirely in place in our present study. (Meinong, *The Theory of Objects*)

16. This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. (Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*)

17. All “normal” people know that snow is white, know that all normal people know that snow is white, know that all normal people know that all normal people know that snow is white, and so on *ad infinitum*. (Schiffer, *Meaning*)

18. Or, to turn briefly to another type of case, if as an examiner I fail a man, I may well cause him distress or indignation or humiliation; and if I am vindictive, I may intend this effect and even intend him to recognize my intention. But I should not be inclined to say that my failing him meant anything. On the other hand, if I cut someone in the street I do feel inclined to assimilate this to the cases of meaning, and this inclination seems to me dependent on the fact that I could not reasonably expect him to be distressed (indignant, humiliated) unless he recognized my intention to affect him in this way. (Grice, “Meaning”)

19. The extension of the term ‘water’ (and, in fact, its “meaning” in the intuitive preanalytical usage of that term) is not a function of the psychological state of the speaker by itself. (Putnam, “Meaning and Reference”)

20. Man, though he have great variety of thoughts, and such from which others as well as himself might receive profit and delight; yet they are all within his own breast, invisible and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made to appear. The comfort and advantage of society not being to be had without communication of thoughts, it was necessary that man should find out some external sensible signs, whereof those invisible ideas, which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others. For this purpose nothing was so fit, either for plenty or quickness, as those articulate sounds, which with so much ease and variety he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how words, which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, came to be made use of by men as the signs of their ideas. (Locke, *Essay*)

21. In the enquiry that follows, I have kept to three fundamental principles: always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective; never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition; never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and object. (Frege, *Grundlagen*)

22. I call a thought something for which the question of truth arises. So I ascribe what is false to a thought just as much as what is true. So I can say: the thought is the sense of the sentence without wishing to say as well that the sense of every sentence is a thought. The thought, in itself immaterial, clothes itself in the material garment of a sentence and thereby becomes comprehensible to us. We say a sentence expresses a thought. (Frege, "The Thought")

23. A child having taken notice of nothing in the metal he hears called gold, but the bright shining yellow colour, he applies the word gold only to his own idea of that colour, and nothing else; and therefore calls the same colour in a peacock's tail gold. Another that hath better observed, adds to shining yellow great weight: and then the sound gold, when he uses it, stands for a complex idea of a shining yellow and a very weighty substance. Another adds to those qualities fusibility: and then the word gold signifies to him a body, bright, yellow, fusible, and very heavy. Another adds malleability. Each of these uses equally the word gold, when they have occasion to express the idea which they have applied it to: but it is evident that each can apply it only to his own idea; nor can he make it stand as a sign of such a complex idea as he has not...(Locke, *Essay* §III.2.3).

24. A robust sense of reality is very necessary in framing a correct analysis of propositions about unicorns, golden mountains, round squares, and other such pseudo-objects. (Russell, "Descriptions")

25. A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so. A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion, on the other hand, uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing. (Donellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions")