"Meaning" IBS- Intention Based Semantics

By: Grice

PRIOR THEORIES

- ► Lockean Veil of Perception: Are we in the box?
- Wittgenstein: We are IN the world and thus, we experience the world directly.
- Kripkenstein: There is NO meaning, ONLY meaningfulness as a function of public rules.
- Grice: There is still meaning and it lies in intention.

Grice's Main Argument

• "...we may sum up what is necessary for A to mean something by X as follows. A must intend to induce by x a belief in an audience and he must also intend his utterance to be recognized as so intended. But these intentions are not independent; the recognition is intended by A to play its part in inducing the belief, and if it does not do so something will have gone wrong with the fulfillment of A's intentions" (383).

Natural and Non-natural Senses of Perception

Natural Sense

- "A means (meant) to do so-and-so (by x)" (378)
- Five Characteristics
- 1. We conclude that "X means P" entails p
- 2. We CANNOT conclude that what was meant by "X" was P
- 3. We CANNOT conclude that someone/anyone meant anything by X
- 4. "'The fact that'" serves as an "approximate restatement"
- 5. We CANNOT find a "restatement" with the "verb 'mean'" and "inverted commas"

Non-Natural Sense

- "A means (meant) something by x"
- "A means (meant) by x that" (379).
- Five Characteristics
- 1. X meant that p [does] not entail p
- 2. Something was meant by X
- 3. [S]omebody meant X
- 4. "The fact that" is not a restatement
- 5. We CAN find a "restatement" with the "verb 'mean'" and "inverted commas"

Objections to Causal Theory (circularity)

Grice *rejects* C.L. Stevenson's claim that in order "for x to mean [in the nonnatural sense] something, x must have (roughly) a tendency to produce in an audience some attitude (cognitive or otherwise) and a tendency, in the case of the speaker to be produced by that attitude" (379-8)

Causal theory only covers "standard"/"general" meaning of signs while meaning deals in particulars" (381)

Isolated Intention as Insufficient

- "[I]f x was intended by its utterer to induce a belief in some 'audience,' and that to say what the belief was would be to say what x meant NN. This will not do" (381).
- ▶ i.e.: Handkerchief at murder scene

Intention and Recognition as Sufficient Conditions

- "meaningNN requires intention of speaker for audience to recognize intention of utterance to be understood.
- ► "A meantNN something by x" means "A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention." (385)
- "x meant something" means/is equivalent to "somebody meantNN something by x" (385)
- i.e.: Showing photograph versus drawing

Imperative Cases

- In the imperative examples, the utterer/speaker/actor does "not intend [the audience's] recognition" (384).
- Examples:
- a. "avaricious" man
- b. Police's methods of stopping a car

Primary Intentions

- Only primary intentions are considered part of meaning of utterances
- For if I utter x, intending (with the aid of the recognition of this intention) to induce an effect E, and intend this effect E to lead to a further effect F, then insofar as the occurrence of F is thought to be dependent solely on E. I cannot regard F as in the least dependent on recognition of my intention to induce E" (386).
- Sean's Court case example

Clarifications

- ► Traffic lights example: always distantly connected with intention
- philosopher's case: "a philosopher asked to explain the meaning of an unclear passage in one of his works), the answer is not based on what he remembers but is more like a decision, a decision about how what he said is to be taken" (387)

Ambiguous Recognitions of Intentions

- Spontaneous versus Deliberate Smiles
- Oral Exams
 - -Would Grice argue that this is not real communication.