


Philosophy 308
The Language Revolution
Russell Marcus
Hamilton College, Fall 2014

A Summary of Kripke's Work
Putnam on Natural Kinds



Business

- Papers are due on Thursday, but may be submitted without penalty any time until the beginning of class on Tuesday.
 - Questions about the assignment?
 - Read the assignment sheet, especially clause 2.
 - Readings section of the website
- Send me any questions for the class to engage by Thursday.
- No text mark-ups for Thursday or next Tuesday
- Chomsky movie
 - Tuesday, October 28, 8pm
 - With discussion to follow

Two Theories of Reference

- One central question of this portion of the course is whether we refer directly or through a description.
- On the direct reference side, we have Mill; the referential half of Donnellan; Kripke; and Russell, for logically proper names.
- On the descriptions side, we have Frege; Russell, for most sentences; Wittgenstein (on Moses); Searle (as quoted in Kripke); and the attributive half of Donnellan.
- The arguments for descriptions
 - Frege's solutions to his three puzzles
 - Russell's analysis of denoting phrases
 - Kripke: 'Jack the Ripper'
- Kripke's arguments provide evidence of deficiencies in description theory.

Cluster Descriptivism

CD1. Every name 'n' is associated with a cluster of properties: the properties that x believes are true of n.

CD2. x believes that these properties pick out a unique individual. (Feynman)




CD3. If y has most of these properties, then y is the referent of 'n'. (Gödel)

CD4. If nothing has most of these properties, 'n' doesn't refer. (Jonah)

CD5. The sentence 'n has most of these properties' is known *a priori* by x. (Aristotle)

CD6. The sentence 'n has most of these properties' as uttered by x expresses a necessary truth. (Aristotle)

Non-Circularity Condition CDC. These properties must be chosen in such a way that there is no circularity. (The properties must not use the notion of reference.)



Rigid Designation

A rigid designator names the same object in all possible worlds, in all counterfactual circumstances.

- Ben Franklin is the inventor of bifocals.
 - ▶ 'the inventor of bifocals' refers non-rigidly
 - ▶ Ben Franklin' refers rigidly
- 'Feynman', 'Gödel', 'Jonah', and 'Aristotle' all refer rigidly, too.



Names and Worlds



- Identity statements between rigid designators must be necessary.
- If *a* is identical with *b*, where ‘*a*’ and ‘*b*’ are names (rigid designators), then, ‘*a*’ refers to *a* in any possible world, and ‘*b*’ refers to *b* in any possible world.
- There could be worlds in which ‘*a*’ does not refer to *a*.
 - ▶ Consider a world in which Katy Perry is named ‘Priscilla G. Snodgrass’.
 - ▶ She would still be Katy Perry.
 - ▶ The term, ‘Katy Perry’, used in our world refers to Priscilla G. Snodgrass in her world.
- If *a* is identical to *b*, where ‘*a*’ and *b*’ rigidly designate, then there are no possible worlds in which *a* is not identical to *b*, nor where ‘*a*=*b*’ is false, if those terms refer as they do in our world.
- There are possible worlds in which ‘Ben Franklin is the inventor of bifocals’ is false, because ‘the inventor of bifocals’ refers, in any possible world, to the actual inventor of bifocals.
 - ▶ In some possible worlds, Franklin was not the inventor of bifocals.
 - ▶ But, in all possible worlds Franklin was Franklin.
- ‘Russell is Professor Marcus’ is true in all possible worlds, even though there are some possible worlds in which I did not become a professor.
 - ▶ We use ‘Professor Marcus’ in this world to refer to me in all possible worlds.

Kripke on Frege's Puzzle



- The problem of cognitive content is solved by recognizing the different epistemic status of 'a=a' and 'a=b'.
 - 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is a necessary truth, but is knowable only *a posteriori*.
 - 'Hesperus is Hesperus' is knowable *a priori*.
- The claim that the first is necessary does not entail that it should have the same cognitive content as the second.
- A version of Frege's puzzle arises if we think that all necessary truths are knowable *a priori*.
- But the category of necessary truths is distinct from that of statements knowable *a priori* or analytic.
- We can tell that 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is not knowable *a priori*, even if it is necessary, since we could be in the same epistemic situation as we are, with Hesperus not being identical to Phosphorus.

Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics

- Kripke's views on naming thus lead to some important consequences for necessity.
- To get clear on them, we needed to talk about some distinctions.
- Linguistics: analytic and synthetic claims
- Epistemology: a priori and a posteriori methods of justification
- Metaphysics: necessary and contingent claims

The Analytic and the Synthetic

A Linguistic Distinction

- Analyticity and syntheticity concern concepts, whatever we take them to be.
- ‘Bachelors are unmarried’ is analytic.
- ‘Bachelors are unhappy’ is synthetic.
- Two kinds of analytic containment
 - Kant: beams in the house
 - Frege: plant in the seeds
 - The difference is in how much unpacking one needs to do.
 - For Frege, a statement is analytic if it follows using the rules of logic.
 - All of arithmetic is analytic, for Frege.



Apriority and Aposteriority

An Epistemological Distinction

- *A posteriori* = empirical
- The analytic/synthetic distinction is independent of the distinction between *a priori* justifications and empirical ones.
- 'Snow is white' is knowable only empirically.
 - ▶ We need to see particular snow in order to know that snow is white.
- '2 + 3 = 5' is knowable *a priori*.
 - ▶ We need experiences with no particular objects in order to know that 2+3=5.
 - ▶ No empirical experiences with undermine that claim.
 - 2 cups of water plus 3 cups of salt

Necessity and Contingency

- Some claims hold necessarily, like mathematical claims.
 - ▶ Leibniz: true in all possible worlds
- Other claims are merely contingent, like the claim that snow is white.
 - ▶ Could be false

The Traditional View

- Necessity - apriority - analyticity
 - Claims are necessary only if they are believed *a priori*.
 - All *a priori* claims must be analytic.
 - One reasons to the truth of an analytic claim without appeal to experience.
- Contingency - aposteriority - syntheticity
 - A claim is contingent when it is justified by appeal to sense experience.
 - Contingent claims bring together concepts that are not necessarily related.
- Hume:
 - Relations of ideas are justified *a priori* and analytic.
 - and thus necessary
 - Matters of fact are justified empirically (by tracing ideas back to initial impressions) and synthetic.
 - and thus contingent


	<i>A priori</i>	Empirical
Analytic	Relations of Ideas	--
Synthetic	--	Matters of Fact



Kant's Adjustment of the Humean View


- All empirical claims are synthetic.
- But some synthetic claims are *a priori*.
 - Metaphysics
 - mathematics
 - some physics
- Still, the class of necessary claims is the same as the class of *a priori* claims.

	<i>A priori</i>	Empirical
Analytic	Logic/ Beams in the House	--
Synthetic	Most Mathematics, Metaphysics, and Some Physics	Empirical Judgments



Kripke's Cleavage

- We should distinguish
 - ▶ semantic claims (involving analyticity, syntheticity, and synonymy)
 - ▶ epistemic claims (involving apriority and aposteriority)
 - ▶ metaphysical claims (involving necessity and contingency).
- “It’s certainly a philosophical thesis, and not a matter of obvious definitional equivalence, either that everything *a priori* is necessary or that everything necessary is *a priori*...They are dealing with two different domains, two different areas, the epistemological and the metaphysical.”
- ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is necessary but *a posteriori*.
 - ▶ The names are rigid designators.
 - The semantic value of the name is the object named.
 - ▶ But we solve the problem of cognitive content: it’s *a posteriori*.



The Necessary *A Posteriori*

- Theoretical definitions
 - ▶ Heat is molecular motion
 - ▶ Water is H₂O .
 - ▶ Lightning is electrical discharge.
- There is a contingent fact about how we experience heat, or lightning, or water.
- We pick out heat, or light, according to contingent facts about how they effect us.
- But, all theoretical identity statements are, in fact, necessary identities, not contingent identities.
- The necessity of these theoretic identification statements follows from the rigid designation of their terms.

The Contingent *A Priori*

- That the standard meter bar is one meter is a contingent fact.
 - ▶ It could be longer or shorter.
- It is known *a priori* that the standard meter is one meter.
- So, ‘the standard meter is one meter long’ is contingent, but known *a priori*.
 - ▶ “Someone who thinks that everything one knows *a priori* is necessary might think: ‘This is the *definition* of a meter. By definition, stick S is one meter long at t_0 . That’s a necessary truth.’ But there seems to me to be no reason so to conclude, even for a man who uses the stated definition of ‘one meter’. For he’s using this definition not to *give the meaning* of what he called the ‘meter’, but to *fix the reference*... There is a certain length which he wants to mark out. He marks it out by an accidental property, namely that there is a stick of that length. Someone else might mark out the same reference by another accidental property. But in any case, even though he uses this to fix the reference of his standard of length, a meter, he can still say, ‘if heat had been applied to this stick S at t_0 , then at t_0 stick S would not have been one meter long’.”



Kripke's View on Reference

Direct Reference

- Descriptivism is false.
- The semantic value of a name is an object.
- Ordinary names are rigid designators.
 - ▶ Names pick out objects, regardless of how we think about those objects.
 - ▶ They even pick out objects in other possible worlds.
 - stipulation, rather than discovery
- Terms other than names may act as rigid designators as well.
 - ▶ indexicals like pronouns, 'now'
 - ▶ the successor of 3
 - ▶ natural kinds? - Putnam

Motivation for Descriptivism

- We need it in order to make sense of reference.
 - ▶ “It is no good using a name for a particular unless one knows who or what is referred to by the use of the name. A name is worthless without a backing of descriptions which can be produced on demand to explain that application” (Strawson, *Individuals* 20).
- How else could people pick up a name in the first place?
- Kripke developed a causal theory of reference.
 - ▶ and some followers of Kripke, like Gareth Evans

The Causal Theory of Reference (CTR)

- “An initial ‘baptism’ takes place. Here the object may be named by ostension, or the reference of the name may be fixed by a description. When the name is ‘passed from link to link’, the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it...”
- An object is named through an initial baptism.
 - ▶ We can baptize through ostension, by pointing at an object.
 - ▶ Or, we can baptize by describing an object.
 - ▶ For instance, I can say that the next apple I see I will call Henry.
- After baptism, a causal chain connects referrers to the initial object.
 - ▶ I dub the apple Henry, then you hear me, and tell others, and eventually everyone calls the apple Henry.
- Thus, we might say that a use of a name refers to an object iff there has been an appropriate causal chain from the initial baptism, through all users of the name, which ends in the particular use in question.

CTR and Direct Reference Theory

- CTR supports Kripke's work on rigidity by providing an account of how we can learn names without ascribing senses to names.
- CTR, though, is an independent account of an independent question.
- Descriptivism and rigidity are claims about the meanings (or semantic values) of names.
- CTR is a theory about how we learn names.
- The first are semantic claims, and the second is epistemological.

Problems with Direct Reference

- Frege's sense descriptivism was motivated by three problems with the 'Fido'-Fido, direct reference theory.
- These problems re-emerge for direct reference theorists.
 - ▶ Cognitive Content
 - Though we've seen Kripke's solution
 - ▶ vacuous reference
 - ▶ opaque contexts


Back to

SQUARE
ONE

Difficulties with CTR

kinks in the causal chain

- 'Madagascar' used to refer to part of the mainland of Africa.
 - ▶ Through mis-communication, it has come to denote an island off of the mainland.
 - ▶ There was a baptism (presumably) and then a causal chain.
 - ▶ But current uses now refer to something other than the original place.
- The notion of a causal chain is also contentious.
- We will not pursue these worries.
 - ▶ What is important to take from the discussion of CTR is the role of the community in naming.
 - ▶ Putnam's division-of-linguistic-labor hypothesis




Putnam's Two Theses

1. Natural-kind terms are rigid designators, like names.
2. What we mean is not exclusively determined by what we think.
 - ▶ Bridges Kripke's insights about rigid designation with semantic externalism.
 - ▶ Externalism: the meanings of our terms are independent of our thoughts.



Burge's Two Worlds



- Consider two possible worlds, w_1 and w_2 .
- In w_1 , which is relevantly like ours, people speak English₁.
 - ▶ Tyler₁ thinks (mistakenly) that he has arthritis in his thigh.
 - ▶ Arthritis only afflicts joints, and the thigh is not a joint.
 - ▶ He has a false belief: “I have arthritis.”
- In w_2 , Tyler₂'s history and experiences are exactly the same as those of Tyler₁ in w_1 .
 - ▶ In w_2 , ‘arthritis’ refers not to arthritis, but to tharthritus.
 - ▶ Tharthritus is like arthritis, but it afflicts bones and joints.
 - ▶ Tyler₂ lacks any beliefs about arthritis.
 - People in w_2 have beliefs about tharthritus.
 - They refer to tharthritus by using the word ‘arthritis’.
 - In w_2 , ‘I have arthritis’ means that one has tharthritus.

Burge's Externalism

- Tyler₂ believes, truly, that he has tharthritis.
 - He expresses that view with the same sentence with which Tyler₁ expresses a false belief that he has arthritis: "I have arthritis."
- Tyler₁ has exactly the same history and experiences as Tyler₂.
- Thus, whether one or the other Tyler has a true belief about tharthritis or a false belief about arthritis depends wholly on matters external to Tyler.
- All that matter to whether Tyler's statement is true or false, and to whether his reference is successful or not, are the practices of the linguistic community in which he finds himself.



Megan and Nate on Putnam

Intensions and Extensions

- We know that terms with the same extension can have different intensions.
 - 'Creature with a heart' and 'creature with a kidney'
- It is surprising that terms with the same intension can have different extensions.

Putnam's Twin Earth



- Imagine two worlds.
- The first world is our Earth.
- The second world is Twin Earth, and it is almost exactly like Earth.
- The only difference between Earth and Twin Earth is that where we have H_2O , Twin Earth has XYZ.
- XYZ is a completely alien compound which looks and tastes and acts just like water.
- Everywhere that we have H_2O , they have XYZ, and vice-versa.
- The Twin Earthlings call XYZ water, just as we call H_2O water.

Water Here and There

- When an Earthling uses the term 'water', s/he is referring to H_2O .
- If Earthlings manufactured or discovered XYZ, we would be wrong to call it water.
- Twin Earthlings use the term 'water' to refer to XYZ.
- 'Water' refers-in-English to water (i.e. H_2O).
- 'Water' refers-in-Twinglish to twater (i.e. XYZ).
- The terms have the same meaning in both languages.
- Earthlings and their Twin Earth counterparts (or, dopplegangers) think of themselves as drinking water, swimming in the water, and washing themselves with water.
- When they think about 'water' they think the same thoughts.
- But, 'water_E' and 'water_{TE}' have different referents.
- The two terms have the same intension but different extensions.

Reference is Beyond Our Grasp

- In one of Putnam's Twin Earth cases, it is 1750 and no one knows anything about chemical analysis.
- No one has any way of knowing that the reference of the term 'water' on Earth and on Twin Earth is different.
- Me and my Twin Earth doppelganger have the same thoughts.
- So, whatever way we think about 'water' is the same.
- Yet, our references are to different substances.
- I can not know that the reference of my term 'water' is water or twater.
- A similar conclusion arises from Putnam's elm/beech case.
 - ▶ His 'elm' thoughts and words mean and refer to elm trees.
 - ▶ His 'beech' thoughts and words mean and refer to beech trees.
 - ▶ But, he doesn't know how to distinguish elms from beeches.
- Our thoughts do not determine the references of our terms.
- But sense (which we grasp) is supposed to determine reference.
 - ▶ By definition



Putnam's Externalism

- Frege believed that when we refer to an object, we do so, privately, by apprehending a public meaning which determines the referent of my term.
 - A. Our thoughts determine the meanings (senses) of our sentences.
 - The psychological state of grasping a concept is private.
 - B. Sense determines reference.
 - It is impossible for terms to differ in extension while having the same intension.
 - C. Reference can vary without variation in thought, as the externalist cases show.
- A, B, and C are internally inconsistent.
 - C is a datum from the thought experiments.
 - Putnam suggests abandoning A.
- “Cut the pie any way you like, “meanings” just ain’t in the *head!*”

The Rigidity of Water

- Putnam's conclusion depends on his claim that the term 'water' is rigid.
- Names are rigid because they refer to the same individual in all possible worlds.
- Natural kind terms, like water, refer to the same thing in all possible worlds.
- We pick out an object, say, by pointing at it.
- We classify it: an elm tree, some water, gold.
- We want to know which other objects are of the same sort.
- So, we need a way of judging whether an object is of that type.
- "When I say "*this* (liquid) is water," the "this" is, so to speak, a *de re* "this" - i.e., the force of my explanation is that "water" is whatever bears a certain equivalence relation...to the piece of liquid referred to as "*this*" *in the actual world* "



Natural Kinds and Hidden Indexicals

- We pick out water by pointing to it, or describing it.
- But, when we want to know what water really is, we ask the scientists.
- Whatever the experts say determines the reference of our terms, even in other possible worlds.
- There is an essence to a natural kind, which is only discoverable within a scientific theory.
- Our natural-kind terms refer rigidly, across worlds.
- “Indexicality extends beyond the *obviously* indexical words and morphemes (e.g., the tenses of verbs). Our theory can be summarized as saying that words like ‘water’ have an unnoticed indexical component: “water” is stuff that bears a certain similarity relation to the water *around here*. Water at another time or in another place or even in another possible world has to bear the relation *same_L* to *our* “water” *in order to be water*. Thus the theory that (1) words have “intensions,” which are something like concepts associated with the words by speakers; and (2) intension determines extension - cannot be true of natural-kind words like ‘water’ for the same reason it cannot be true of obviously indexical words like ‘I’.”

More Necessary *A Posteriori*

- 'Water' designates rigidly.
- 'H₂O' designates rigidly, as the name of a particular kind of molecule.
- Thus, 'water is H₂O', like 'Hesperus is Phosphorus', is necessary, but discovered a posteriori.

Artifacts

- Terms for artifacts, unlike terms for natural kinds, presumably lack essences, and so lack the indexical quality of natural kinds.
- There is no essence to a chair or a shirt that scientists could discover.
- Artifacts may be made of varying materials.
- They might have some functional essence.
- But, the rules governing the uses of artifact terms are likely to be mainly pragmatic.

Ambiguous Cases

- jadeite/nephrite
 - ▶ The term 'jade' refers to two different elements (jadeite and nephrite) with two different microstructures.
 - ▶ 'Jade' refers not to a single substance with a single essence.
- autism
 - ▶ refers to a range of different essential structures



The Division of Linguistic Labor

- Locke claimed that communication was only possible because the referents of my words were my thoughts.
- Frege divided our grasp of a sense (internal) from the reference it determines (external).
- Kripke argued that reference is direct.
- For Putnam, the reference of 'water' is determined not by the individual, but by a small group of experts, the scientists, who determine what the essence of the natural kind is.
- The class of people who need to acquire a given natural kind term is larger than the class who need to know how to recognize it.
- It is too time-consuming and inefficient for members of a community to all know how to identify surely each term.
 - ▶ “It is obviously necessary for every speaker to be able to recognize water (reliably under normal conditions), and probably most adult speakers even know the necessary and sufficient condition “water is H₂O,” but only a few adult speakers could distinguish water from liquids that superficially resembled water. In case of doubt, other speakers would rely on the judgment of these “expert” speakers. Thus the way of recognizing possessed by these “expert” speakers is also, through them, possessed by the collective linguistic body, even though it is not possessed by each individual member of the body, and in this way the most *recherché* fact about water may become part of the *social* meaning of the word although unknown to almost all speakers who acquire the word.”

Reference and the Experts

- Reference is determined only by the experts in a division of linguistic labor.
- The average speaker does not acquire anything which fixes the extension of the term.
- Ordinary people have facility with stereotypes, which they can indicate through ostensive definition or by description.
 - ▶ In describing, one might refer to a stereotype, an exemplar with typical features.
 - ▶ Speakers are required to know about the stereotype in order to count as having acquired a word.
 - ▶ These requirements vary with the community and its needs.
- When we call something ‘water’, we imply that the microstructure must be the same for anything else to be water.
- The references of our natural-kind terms depend not on our individual thoughts or intentions but on the community as a whole.
- “There are two sorts of tools in the world: there are tools like a hammer or a screwdriver which can be used by one person; and there are tools like a steamship which require the cooperative activity of a number of persons to use. Words have been thought of too much on the model of the first sort of tool.”