

- [Putnam and Kripke] articulate in an interesting and perceptive way an unexpected and surprising intuition we ordinarily have about meaning (at least many philosophers seem to have found this intuition surprising). The intuition is that meaning is, in Putnam's words, not in the head. We have the intuition that what a word means, for a person, depends not only on what is going on internally with that person, but also on facts about the world external to the person (84).
- In contrast, that the claim of semantic externalism is not merely an intuition.
- It is the conclusion of an argument.
 - ▶ 1. The sense (or meaning) of a term determines its reference. That is, it is impossible for terms to differ in extension while having the same intension.
 - ▶ 2. Reference can vary without variation in thought.
 - ▶ 3. So, the senses of terms must be able to vary without variation in thought.
 - ▶ So, our thoughts do not determine the meanings of our terms; meanings are not in the head.
- The conclusion of semantic externalism can only be made in the context of a wider argument.
- That conclusion is made precisely by an explicit reasoning process that a person can consciously observe, contradicting their claim that it is an intuition.
- Within philosophy of mind, there has been a tradition of either accidentally confusing different uses of intuition, or deliberately treating them as identical, and consequently drawing inappropriate conclusions... (84)