Philosophy 101: Introduction to Philosophy, Queens College, Spring 2005

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Lecture Notes, March 7

#### I. Dualism and Monism

Descartes is a dualist, believing that there are minds (both finite and infinite) and bodies.

We will read Locke as a materialist monist.

A monist believes that there is only one kind of substance.

Locke is really a dualist, believing that there is a God, who is a different kind of substance.

But we will read him more conveniently as a materialist.

Hobbes was really a materialist, and contemporary science tends toward materialism by identifying the mind with the brain.

Berkeley, who we will read after Locke, is a different kind of monist, an idealist monist.

### II. Starting the Sixth Meditation

The deceiver eliminated knowledge of math and of universals, all Class III knowledge, as we called it. Since Descartes has eliminated the deceiver, he reclaims mathematics, in MV.

We can be sure of mathematical truths themselves, and mathematical properties of objects (e.g. length, shape, and anything describable using mathematics).

Sensory information is still in doubt, since the dream argument lingers, even with the defeat of the deceiver.

The problems of the resemblance hypothesis have not been resolved.

#### III. Blocking the dream argument

Meditation VI, pp 89-90.

Waking experience is connected in the way that dreams are not.

Now, Descartes has a way of reclaiming items of Class II.

The physical world was brought into doubt by the dream argument.

I now see a way of judging clearly and distinctly whether I am dreaming.

So, I can reclaim the objects brought into doubt by the dream argument.

Still, I must be careful not to be misled by the (false) resemblance hypothesis.

## IV. Knowledge that physical objects can exist

Meditation VI, p 71.

God is omnipotent.

So, he can create anything that I can perceive.

In fact, he can create anything that does not create a contradiction.

He may not be able to create a round square, or a sphere that's both blue and red all over.

Still, the question remains whether he did in fact create these things.

# V. Knowledge that physical objects do exist

(Be careful to distinguish this argument from the one above.) See pp 79-80.

- 1) I seem to sense objects.
- 2) If I seem to sense objects, while there are none, then God is a deceiver.
- 3) God is no deceiver.

So, Physical objects exist.

What are these objects like?

Only their mathematical properties are clear and distinct.

This is primarily their extension, p 80.

Their sensory properties are in doubt.

That is, we never defeat the illusion doubt, in the way that we reject the other two arguments for doubt.

The Resemblance Hypothesis is our major source of error.

So what good are the senses, then?

#### VI. The role of the senses

The senses provide natural protection of our bodies, p 81.

This is just the best structure for humans.

It is far better to be deceived once in a while, pp 83-4; also pp 88-9.

The important point is that bodies are perceived by the mind alone, and only have extension as a real property.

The others are confused representations.

Locke and Berkeley take up this topic.

Still, our errors make God seem deceptive.

He could prevent them.

Descartes uses the mind/body distinction to block this accusation.

#### VII. The mind/body distinction

Descartes first argues that we are thinking things, i.e. minds alone, p 78.

That is, the mind is distinct from the body.

- 1) I have a clear and distinct understanding of my mind, without my body.
- 2) I have a clear and distinct understanding of my body, without my mind.
- 3) Whatever I can clearly and distinctly conceive of as separate, can be separated by God, and so are really distinct.

So, my mind is distinct from my body

Another proof of the distinctness of the mind and body, from the divisibility or body, pp 85-6.

- 1) Whatever two things have different properties are different objects.
- 2) The mind is indivisible.
- 3) The body is divisible.

So, the mind is not the body.