

Introduction to Philosophy

Philosophy 110W
Fall 2014
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Class #23 - Intro to Consciousness

Business

- Finishing Mind today
 - ▶ Sarah on Jackson
 - ▶ Wrap-up on Thursday
 - ▶ Ginger starts us on ethics on Thursday
- Final Exam Prep Sheet
- Right Now: Groups of Four
 - Dualism
 - Behaviorism
 - Identity Theory
 - Functionalism
 - ▶ Worksheet
 - Hand in one sheet with group name and all individual names
 - ▶ Two strengths (arguments for)
 - ▶ Two weaknesses (arguments against)

Motivations for Functionalism

- Avoid the identity theorist's chauvinism and non-relational construal of mental states
- Avoid the behaviorist's denigration of internal states
 - "Since mental states interact in generating behavior, it will be necessary to find a construal of psychological explanations that posits mental processes: causal sequences of mental events" (Fodor 454a).
- Type mental states according to behavior
- Abstract away from the particular hardware
- The mind is the software of the brain.
 - "In the functionalist view the psychology of a system depends not on the stuff it is made of (living cells, metal or spiritual energy) but on how the stuff is put together" (Fodor 451).

Generalizing Over the Hardware

- Functionalist definition of pain
 - A thing is in pain if it has been affected in certain relevant ways, and if it has other concomitant mental and behavioral states (like wincing or crying) which are causally related to it.
- When we are researching the mental states of a particular organism, we will of course look at the specific causal processes involved.
- But, when we generalize to a functionalist theory of mind, we abstract away from physical particulars.
- Ramsification: a logical trick to eliminate irrelevant vocabulary from the theoretical identity sentences of a formal theory of mental states.
- Replace references to the specifically mental parts of this theory, pains and color terms and beliefs, with variables.

David Lewis on Ramsification

- We are assembled in the drawing room of the country house; the detective reconstructs the crime. That is, he proposes a *theory* designed to be the best explanation of phenomena we have observed: the death of Mr. Body, the blood on the wallpaper, the silence of the dog in the night, the clock seventeen minutes fast, and so on. He launches into his story:
- X, Y and Z conspired to murder Mr. Body. Seventeen years ago, in the gold fields of Uganda, X was Body's partner... Last week, Y and Z conferred in a bar in Reading... Tuesday night at 11:17, Y went to the attic and set a time bomb... Seventeen minutes later, X met Z in the billiard room and gave him the lead pipe... Just when the bomb went off in the attic, X fired three shots into the study through the French windows...
- And so it goes: a long story. Let us pretend that it is a single long conjunctive sentence. The story contains the three names 'X', 'Y' and 'Z'. The detective uses these new terms without explanation, as though we knew what they meant. But we do not. We never used them before, at least not in the senses they bear in the present context. All we know about their meanings is what we gradually gather from the story itself. Call these theoretical terms (T-terms for short) because they are introduced by a theory.

Psychology

- A psychological theory correlates mental states with inputs and outputs.
 $T(s_1 \dots s_n, i_1 \dots i_m, o_1 \dots o_k)$
 - i_{7345} = having an orange soda can in front of you
 - s_{2342} = seeing the cylindrical orange patch
 - s_{4873} = desiring orange soda
 - s_{92357} = enjoying an orange soda
 - o_{983} = Saying, 'Ahh, I enjoyed that orange soda'
- E.g. Whenever a person is in state s_{4873} and receives input i_{7345} so that she develops state s_{2342} , she also moves into state s_{92357} and produces output o_{983} .
- For the identity theorist, the s_n are human brain states.

Behaviorist Psychology

- $B(i_1 \dots i_n, o_1 \dots o_m)$
- Look, Ma, no mental state terms!
- Parsimony

Identity Theory (But Multiple Realizability)

- $T(s_1 \dots s_n, i_1 \dots i_m, o_1 \dots o_k)$
- The s_n are all human brain states.
- To avoid problems of multiple realizability, we want to generalize over the s_n .
- The functionalist satisfies the multiple realizability condition by claiming that the $s_1 \dots s_n$ can refer to any kinds of states.
 - even states of an immaterial soul

Ramsification

- To generalize, we replace this theory...
 - ▶ $T(s_1 \dots s_n, i_1 \dots i_m, o_1 \dots o_k)$
- ...with this one:
 - ▶ $\exists x_1 \dots \exists x_n T(x_1 \dots x_n, i_1 \dots i_m, o_1 \dots o_k)$
- p is enjoying an orange soda iff $\exists x_1 \dots \exists x_n T(x_1 \dots x_n, i_1 \dots i_m, o_1 \dots o_k)$ and p is in x_{92357}
 - ▶ a functional, causal-role definition of your mental states
- x is in pain iff x has been affected by the kinds of things that cause pain, has other mental states that generally accompany pain, and exhibits the kind of behavior that are associated with pain.
- Pain is whatever has the place that pain has in your life.
 - ▶ preceded by physical or emotional blows
 - ▶ succeeded by characteristic behavior
 - avoidance
 - valiant confrontation
 - ▶ engenders certain other mental states
 - fear or anger or resignation

Problems with Functionalism

- The central problems with functionalism have to do with its treatment of particular kinds of mental states.
- Remember that we can type mental states into two classes
 - ▶ Intentional states (e.g. beliefs)
 - ▶ Qualitative State (seeing yellow, feeling pain)
- Sarah is going to talk about one kind of problem for functionalism arising from considerations of qualitative states.

Sarah on the Qualia Freaks