

## John Carroll- Three Counterexamples to the Humean Tradition

### The Big Prize

Complete S1 in a non-circular way, and without a nomic sentence (186-7). Nomic sentences are causal sentences.

(S1) It is a law that all Fs are Gs if and only if...

### Humean Supervenience

#### *First stab-Naive Regularity Account*

It is a law that all Fs are Gs if and only if (i) all Fs are Gs, and (ii) the generalization that all Fs are Gs is lawlike; that is, (a) it is not necessary that all Fs are Gs, and (b) the generalization is unrestricted (it involves only non-local, empirical predicates apart from logical connectives and quantifiers.)(190)

#### *Troubles:*

- Vacuously True Generalizations (191)
  - “All unicorns weigh ninety pounds”
- Troublesome Predicates (192)
  - “All unicorns or ravens are black”
  - “All emeralds are grue”
- Puzzle (192)
  - “All gold spheres are less than ten feet in diameter”

#### *Second Stab 1- Epistemological Approach*

- Goodman and Skyrms
- Laws are the generalizations we want to hold and confirmed by induction (196)
- Problems with objectivity

#### *Second Stab 2- Systematic Approach (Systems)*

- MRL
- Laws are the generalizations that fit into the strongest, most simple system (197)
- Problems with probability

### Counter-examples

#### *1. From Tooty*

-U<sub>1</sub>-“no particles of type X are subject to fields of type Y though the generalization, L<sub>1</sub>, that all X-particles subject to Y-fields have *spin up*.” And L<sub>2</sub> all X-particles subject to Y-fields have *spin down* (202, 212-3).

- First, is L<sub>1</sub> a law for the Humean if there are no instances? (202-3)
- Second, if L<sub>1</sub> is true of U<sub>1</sub> and L<sub>2</sub> of U<sub>2</sub>, what is the difference for the Humean between the two universes? (213-4)

## 2. Probability

- U<sub>3</sub> 8/9 X-particles have spun up. (214-5)
  - Small enough number that the law could be any probability (8/9, 8/10, 9/10)
  - The law could be 9/10 in one universe and 8/10 in the other.
  - Like U1 and U2, U3 and U4 need not have nominalistic differences.
- Laws are not vacuous as they were in counterexample 1

## 3. Laws without Instances

- Two Universes: U<sub>5</sub> and U<sub>6</sub> (215-7)
  - At 't<sub>0</sub>' W-particles are introduced into the universes, in U<sub>5</sub> they spin up, in U<sub>6</sub> they spin down.
  - These "spins" are laws in each Universe respectively.
  - All particles in either universe may appear and disappear in an instant.
- U<sub>5\*</sub> and U<sub>6\*</sub> are two new universes that have all the same laws as U<sub>5</sub> and U<sub>6</sub> except at time 't<sub>0</sub>' all particles disappeared.
  - Because U<sub>5\*</sub> and U<sub>6\*</sub> are analogous with U<sub>5</sub> and U<sub>6</sub> they carry all the laws of those universes.
  - The spin laws of each exist before and after 't<sub>0</sub>'
  - Because they exist in U<sub>5\*</sub> and U<sub>6\*</sub> after there are no particles, it is clear that they are not dependant on the particles for existence.
- These "empty" universes still exist and have different laws from one another.

### *Others:*

- There are many empty possible worlds in which there are many different sets of laws (Newtonian to Aristotelian).
- There are non-nomical worlds
- Worlds with no laws at all

## Conclusion

- All reductive accounts of laws fail
- Accepts *Irreducibility Thesis* – All reductive laws fail
- Rejects *Supervenience Thesis*- "two possible worlds which agree on *all* non-nomic facts must agree on which laws hold"