Putnam starts off his case with an argument against the semantic argument against materialism. As properties, mental states and brain states can be the same though as concepts, they are not. (ex. Temperature and mean molecular energy)

Putnam has three problems with identity theory brought on by multiple realizability:

1. Chauvinistic: animals and aliens are not able to experience the mental states we are familiar with.
2. Doesn't consider neurological equipotentiality: individuals who have differently functional brains can still experience the same mental states without being in the same brain state. It is a direct contradiction to type physicalism.
3. non-relational construal: ignores the interactions/influences mental states have with and on each other.

These are problems because identity theory is type physicalism. These are not issues for token physicalists

Problems with behaviorism…
- Putnam: kicking example
- Fodor: chess example

Functionalism: "…its guiding principle is that we can define mental states by a triplet of relations: what typically causes them, what effects they have on other mental states, and what effects they have on behavior." (The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy)[1]
- Avoids problems of both identity theory and behaviorism but includes the useful aspects of both. Like behaviorism, functionalism considers the relationship between behaviors and mental states. At the same time, functionalism recognizes that mental states affect each other, like with identity theory.
- Putnam likens minds to a kind of turing machine, or computer. These machines have a table that is composed of: a list of all possible states of the system and the possible inputs and outputs. The machine's actions are determined by a set of rules that govern the machine given the variables in the table at a given time.
- Putnam's definition of the mind includes four clauses: pg 434
    1. "all organisms capable of feeling pain are probabilistic automata.
    2. every organism capable of feeling pain possess at least one Description of a certain kind…
    3. no organism capable of feeling pain possesses a decomposition into parts which separately possess Descriptions of the kind referred to in (2).
    4. for every Description of the kind referred to in 2, there exists a subset of sensory inputs such that an organism with that description is in pain when and only when some of its sensory inputs are in that subset."

[1] "functionalism" The Oxford Dictionary o Philosophy. Simon Blackburn. Oxford University Press, 1996. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. Hamilton College. 7 September 2008
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t98.e983

Prof. Marcus's reading questions:

1. What is multiple realizability? Why is it a problem with the identity theory (type physicalism)?
2. According to functionalism, what are mental states?
3. What is a relational construal of mental states and how does it relate to the problems of multiple realizability? How does functionalism respect the "ontological autonomy of mental particulars" (Fodor)
4. How is functionalism similar to behaviorism? How is it similar to identity theory?